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Looking beyond Sibiu:
EU cooperation can move forward – flexibly
 by Julian Rappold and Daniela Schwarzer
The European Council meeting in Sibiu on 9 May was intended to boost the European 
Union two weeks ahead of the European parliamentary election, and in the wake of the 
original March Brexit date. However, divided amongst themselves, the EU leaders are 
shying away from notable commitments even though citizens’ support for the EU has 
actually increased. The likely limited results of Sibiu reflect the current state of the EU, 
but do not necessarily determine its future after the election.
European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker set 
a high bar in his State of the Union address in September 
2018 when he stressed that “Sibiu is the moment we must 
offer all Europeans a strong perspective for the future”. 
The summit of the European Council in the central Roma-
nian city was designed as a key event to underscore the 
unity of the European Union. Only two weeks ahead of 
the European parliamentary election, it was intended to 
conclude the debate on the ‘Future of Europe’ that started 
as a direct reaction to the United Kingdom’s 2016 decision 
to leave the EU. With original expectations that Brexit 
would have come to pass by now, the summit was sup-
posed to illustrate the EU’s achievements, strengthen its 
legitimacy, combat Euroskepticism and connect the union 
with disaffected citizens. At Sibiu, the EU was meant to 
look forward and move into the future.
Expectations Meet Reality:  
Paralysis and Division Hinder EU Progress
However, not much is left of these high-flying ambitions. 
The mismatch between former expectations and today’s 
political reality speaks volumes about the state of the EU. 
The decision to postpone Brexit has disrupted the timing 
and narrative of the Sibiu summit. Concerns about rising 
anti-EU populist parties have paralyzed political leaders 
in a number of EU member states. Even more, the EU’s 
current Romanian Presidency is itself embroiled in con-
flict with Brussels for backsliding on the rule of law: Only 
in March, the European Commission cited the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Viorica Dăncilă for hindering the 
appointment of prominent anti-corruption fighter Laura 
Codruta Kovesi to the post of the new European Public 
Prosecutor.
EU leaders are likely to avoid substantial, and possibly 
divisive, debates in Sibiu – despite the urgency to demon-
strate, both the willingness to act and the ability to define 
a forward-looking agenda for the EU-27. Instead, they will 
limit themselves to preliminary discussions on the new 
Strategic Agenda for the next five years and postpone 
major decisions to the European Council meeting on 20/21 
June when the final document is due to be adopted.
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Europe’s Paradox:  
Citizens Embrace EU, Governments Hesitate
The European Council’s gap between declared ambition 
and likely real achievement at this moment of strategic 
importance ahead of the EU’s new institutional cycle is 
the more striking as it is actually paradoxical: Most heads 
of state and government, with the notable exception of 
France’s President Emmanuel Macron, have not put for-
ward European ambitions that seem up to the challenge. 
By contrast citizens’ support for the European Union has 
actually increased since the Brexit referendum of 2016. 
According to the European Parliament’s Spring 2019 
Eurobarometer, which was conducted three months 
ahead of the European election, more than two thirds 
(68 percent) of citizens in the EU-27 believe that their 
countries have benefitted from being a member of the EU. 
In total, 61 per cent say that their country’s membership 
is a good thing. This is a marked increase from 60 percent 
and 53 percent respectively shortly after the United King-
dom’s Brexit Referendum in 2016. EU member states have 
also returned to a path of economic growth and the EU 
has overall remained resilient despite the many internal 
and external challenges it has been facing in recent years.
 
From Bad to Worse:  
More Challenges to Come
As the run-up to the Sibiu summit reveals, however, Eu-
rope’s situation today is much more challenging than it 
was five years ago, and it is likely to remain so: The level 
of fragmentation and distrust among member states has 
increased. Ruptures have emerged between the Union’s 
North and South in the wake of the European sovereign 
debt crisis, and between the East and West over migra-
tion. EU governments have been increasingly unable 
to achieve reforms in key policy areas, for instance on 
migration or the euro area. As European governments 
have missed this window of opportunity to make the EU 
crisis-proof, the EU may also be confronted with eco-
nomic stagnation in the coming years. In addition, with 
the parliamentary election drawing near, some political 
parties in member states, such as France’s Rassemblement 
National, formerly Front National, or the Italian Lega, 
are openly Euroskeptic and seek to destabilize the future 
European parliament from within. Some EU members, 
such as Poland, Hungary and Romania, run foul of basic 
principles of the Union by openly undermining the rule of 
law or democracy in their countries. 
The Tasks Ahead:  
Agenda, Personnel, Finances
And yet, crucial tasks lie ahead: The divisions in the 
European Council will likely complicate agreement on a 
coherent and consistent Strategic Agenda that outlines 
ambitious priorities for the EU’s next five years. A complex 
leadership puzzle also awaits the EU as five top jobs need 
to be filled at the helm of the European Commission, the 
European External Action Service, the European Council, 
the European Parliament and the European Central Bank. 
Finding an agreement that takes into account party-
political, geographic, age and gender criteria may well 
take until the end of 2019. Finally, the next Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021 to 2027 will have to 
be negotiated – a huge bargaining process that involves 
trade-offs between member states and between policy 
fields. This lengthy and tedious process might turn out 
to be even more complicated and may only be concluded 
under the German EU Council Presidency in the second 
half of 2020.
There is an indisputable risk that both, the political 
divides among member states’ governments and the 
readiness of more Europeans to cast anti-EU votes, will 
leave the EU in a defensive and reactionary mode. This 
is of concern also as external challenges, such as the 
EU’s deteriorating security environment or the decline of 
transatlantic relations, are likely to increase. Equally, in-
terferences in the EU will continue to rise, for example as 
a result of populist parties’ ties with Russia, and Russian 
efforts to undermine the stability of the European Union, 
for instance by means of regional conflicts or disinforma-
tion campaigns.
Options for Action:  
Pragmatism and Efficiency 
Given these internal and external challenges, the most 
viable course for EU leaders in the near future is to aim 
for pragmatism and incremental adjustments rather than 
large-scale ambitions. This applies, in particular, to those 
policy priorities in which member states cannot deliver 
solutions on their own, but in which, together in the EU, 
they can make a real difference to their citizens. The 
pragmatic but realistic slogan of the Strategic Priorities 
Milestones of the ‚Future of Europe‘ Debate:
 . Bratislava Roadmap, September 2016
 . Rome Declaration, March 2017
 . Leaders’ Agenda, September 2017
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for the last European Commission, “big on big things, 
small on small things”, remains topical in this context. 
Issues of choice for the EU agenda should therefore be 
security and defense, climate protection and energy, mi-
gration, the euro area and the Single Market. 
Where stalemate cannot be overcome, EU member 
states should opt for enhanced cooperation as a prag-
matic instrument to move beyond the smallest common 
denominator. Staying true to the EU’s guiding principles 
of openness, inclusiveness and efficiency in such coop-
eration can maintain the EU’s ability and responsiveness 
in addressing current and future challenges. Moving 
towards Qualified Majority Voting in certain policy fields, 
particularly in foreign policy, could also ensure greater 
efficiency in decision-making. Of course, it would be diffi-
cult to implement in times of deepening internal divisions.
Keeping the Union:  
Cooperation and Cohesion 
The Sibiu summit – which takes place on the anniversary 
of the 1950 Schuman declaration that paved the way for 
the European Economic Community and subsequently 
the European Union – comes at a moment of strategic 
importance for the EU. That it will hardly meet its initially 
high expectations, however, does not necessarily say 
much about the EU’s mid-term future after the European 
parliamentary election. EU leaders anxiously expect 
the outcome of the polls and the implications which the 
likely reshuffle of the party-political landscape will have 
for the institutional functioning of the European Union. 
Most probably, the EU will be even more fragmented and 
complex after May 26. In this scenario, the task is to drive 
forward pragmatic cooperation in specific policy fields 
and to involve those countries which are willing to tackle 
the complex issues in a cooperative and integrated man-
ner. If they manage to do so while preserving the Union’s 
political, legal and institutional cohesion, they are likely 
to be successful. If other member states wish to join them, 
they are welcome to make themselves heard.
Julian Rappold is Research Fellow in the Alfred von Op-
penheim Center for European Policy Studies of the of the 
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). 
 
Dr. Daniela Schwarzer is Director of the German Council 
on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
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